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RECENT DECISIONS
TRADE REGULATION - TRADING STAMPS - EXCHANGE OF STAMPS FOR
STAMPS NOT UNFAIR COMPETITION - Merchants Green Trading Stamp Company,
being engaged in the business of promoting the sale of retail merchandise through
the use and distribution of trading stamps, sought to enjoin Vornado, Inc., from
exchanging its own stamps for those of Merchants. Merchants Green Trading
Stamp Company had expended considerable funds in advertising its trading stamp
business. Exclusive territorial franchise agreements had been made with retail
merchandisers, in conjunction with the establishment of several redemption centers.
Vornado, Inc., issued its own stamps with food purchases made by customers at any
of its stores, exchanging books of any other trading stamps with food purchases of
$5.00 or more. The exchanges were carried on on a one-for-one basis, but in no
single transaction was more than one book of a competitor's stamps exchanged.
Plaintiff alleged that Vornado, Inc., had appropriated its advertising and redemption
system, and thus Vornado was destroying the plaintiff's trading stamp business.
On motion for interlocutory injunction before the Hudson County Superior Court,
it was held: that the injunction should be denied. The exchanging by Vornado
of its stamps for those issued by the plaintiff was the exercise of nontortious business
ingenuity which lacked any malicious intent or unfair means. Merchants Green
Trading Stamp Co. v. Vornado, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 523, 183 A.2d 489 (Hudson
County Ct. 1962).
In recent years the courts have confined their decisions dealing with trading
stamps to the issue of the constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting their dis-
tribution and the problem of violation of Fair Trade Laws. This is the first case
in many years in which the rights of the stamp holder is the controlling issue. In
an identical case another New Jersey county court has recently granted an in-
junction prohibiting the exchange of stamps. This Morris County Court case'
must have accepted the plaintiff's contention that the limitations imposed upon the
use of their stamps by the trading stamp company were enforceable. But in the
Merchants case, the court steered away from this problem. To reach its result the
court was required to distinguish between Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Siegel,
Cooper & Co.,2 and Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co.3 The 1923
Siegel case turned upon the intent held by Sperry & Hutchinson in attempting to
redeem stamps purchased from another after the issuer had assigned the redemption
obligation. Sperry & Hutchinson had its employees pose as customers in order to
deceive the redemption center. The court held that Sperry & Hutchinson had used
these expressly nontransferable stamps to its own advantage and to the detriment
of the redemption center, and therefore was not entitled to have the stamps
redeemed. In the 1908 Weber case the trading stamp company was granted an
injunction prohibiting Weber from sending out agents to sell or exchange Weber's
stamps for partly filled books of the plaintiff. Once Weber had exchanged these
stamps he would then resell them at a lower price. Thus, Weber deliberately entered
into a course of conduct logically calculated to injure the plaintiff. It was an in-
tentional appropriation of the plaintiff's stamps, and direct interference in its
contracts and business. But in Vornado, the court found no scheme to injure the
trading stamp company as in Siegel, and no direct interference with, or appropria-
tion of, the stamps as in Weber. Vornado, Inc., had forthrightly offered to exchange
its stamps for those of the plaintiff. No artifice was used to induce plaintiff to
redeem its stamps, nor was an attempt made to obtain the stamps by inducing the
1 Letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Stanton, Judge, Morris County Superior Court, to
Stephen Bower, November 30, 1962, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library. Judge Stanton
stated that there had been a motion for an interlocutory injunction before him, which was de-
cided from the bench, and with no opinion being filed.
2 309 Ill. 193, 140 N.E. 864 (1923).
3 161 Fed. 219 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1908).
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retail merchants in the system. to sell directly to Vornado in violation of their con-
tract with the trading stamp company.
The court relied upon Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster4 and Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing CoA to answer the plaintiff's contention
that Vornado's activity was an illegal appropriation of the promotional and
advertising aspect of the issued trading stamps. In the former case, the court
granted an injunction to a trading stamp company prohibiting Fenster from using
plaintiff's stamps for his advertising purposes. The stamps had been obtained from
retail merchants in violation of the contract that they had with the trading stamp
company. The court reasoned that since the retail merchants had paid consideration
for the privilege of giving out the stamps and since Fenster knew that the licenses
were for a limited use, Fenster could not obtain the benefits of the contracts without
providing his own consideration. Fenster was not allowed to reissue these stamps
and thus obtain the benefits of the extensive advertising promotion of the trading
stamp company. In the Mechanics' Clothing Co. case, the court refused to allow
the defendant to advertise that he had a special arrangement with the trading
stamp company whereby the defendant was allowed to give double the usual
amount of stamps. The Mechanics' Clothing Co. had obtained some of its stamps
from licensed retail merchants and some from customers. This was considered a
"fraudulent scheme and unwarranted attack upon .the business of the [trading
stamp company]." 6 The activity in the Vornado case is far from that in Fenster
and Mechanics' Clothing Co.; Vornado had only advertised that it would exchange
its stamps for those of any trading company.7 Therefore, the court concluded that
there had been no intent to appropriate the advertising benefits of the trading stamps,
nor any attempt to reissue the stamps which might incidentally result in a pro-
motional advantage.
Having concluded that there had been no malicious intent to injure the trading
stamp company, and that the means used were honest and forthright, the court said
that the exchanging of the stamps alone could not amount to a tortious act. The
difference, said Judge Pashman, "may be fairly characterized as competitive direct-
ness.., as opposed to and contrasted with deceptive and faudulent self-dealing. . ..
The court admitted that it had not dealt with the problem as to whether or
not the relationship arising between the trading stamp company and the buying
public was entitled to judicial protection. But it is submitted that this question is un-
avoidable, since the authority that it relied upon was factually distinguishable from
the Vornado case. In the long line of Sperry & Hutchinson cases9 the courts were
only concerned with the use of the stamps in their capacity as advertising and
promotional devices - that is, the use of the stamps as evidence of a right to be
honored on redemption was not the main inquiry. The cases were more concerned
with the interference with, or perversion of, the contracts that the trading stamp
company had made with its retail merchants. The court in the Vornado case found
that there had been no illegal activity relating to the merchant-trading stamp com-
pany contracts, either in interference with the contract, or in appropriation of ad-
vertising benefits. Thus, the narrow issue should have been whether Vornado could
legally take the trading stamps from the buying public for redemption. This inquiry
will have to be answered before this case can be laid to rest. The contemporaneous
4 219 Fed. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
5 128 Fed. 800 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904).
6 Id. at 804.
7 Merchants Green Trading Stamp Co. v. Vornado, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 523, 183 A.2d
489, 495 (Hudson County Ct. 1962).
8 Id. at 495.
9 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster, 219 Fed. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1915); Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. Louis Weber & Co., 161 Fed. 219 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 190.8); Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Mechanics' Clothing Co., 128 Fed. 800 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Siegel,
Cooper & Co., 309 Ill. 193, 140 N.E. 864 (1923).
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Morris County Court case that was not published apparently took this approach -
it held that the trading stamp company could obtain an injunction to prevent
Vornado from exchanging its stamps for those of S. & H.
Merchants Green Trading Stamp Co. contended that the buying public takes
the trading stamps subject to the following terms: 1) the title to the stamps remains
in the trading stamp company; 2) the stamps are not transferable without the
written consent of the company; 3) the only right which the customer acquires
is to paste the stamps in the collector's book, and present them for redemption.10
The courts generally have agreed that a trading stamp is not property, in the full
sense.:" The cases reach no agreement as to what it actually is. Instead of labeling,
one court has characterized the stamp in this manner:
The trading stamp, when issued, represents a closed transaction be-
tween the merchant and the company, as well as an outstanding obligation
to redeem the stamp. As a token or voucher of the sale and use of so much
advertising, the trading stamp is necessarily a consumable article - an
article designed for a single use in an advertising scheme. 2
Since it appears that stamps are evidence of a contractual obligation, the
pivotal inquiry will be the extent of their legal enforceability. The trading stamp
company contends that the stamps are nontransferable. If this is so, and this term
is legally binding upon the customers who receive these stamps, then Vornado's
right to redemption is voidable. If the stamps are nontransferable as per the
terms of the agreement between the trading stamp company and the buying public,
it must be shown that they were accepted as such. The trading stamp company
relies upon its recital of the stamps' terms contained in their collection books.13 The
10 Merchants Green Trading Stamp Co. v. Vornado, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 523, 183 A.2d
489, 490 (Hudson County Ct. 1962).
11 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co., 161 Fed. 219, 221 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1908). In Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833, 834
(C.C.D.R.I. 1904), the court said, "A trading stamp is not ordinary property. It is sui gen-
ers. It represents a ... complicated transaction ... ." In Independent News Co. v. Williams,
293 F.2d 510 (3rd Cir. 1961), Section 2-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code was not
applied to trading stamps; this section provides "(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to
a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the en-
truster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." But the trading stamp case holds that a
person may acquire title for redemption, but not necessarily for promotional purposes. Thus,
there was no totality of rights entrusted and the Uniform Commercial Code could not apply.
12 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833, 834-35
(C.C.D.R.I. 1904).
13 In MacDonald Plaid Stamp Saver Book the following appears:
[Tihe following rights and conditions are expressly reserved by this
company, which the persons acquiring [the stamps] expressly accept ....
[A]t all times the title thereto being expressly reserved in this company...
The only right you acquire in Plaid stamps is to paste them in MacDonald
Plaid Stamp saver book and present them to us for redemption .... If the
stamps or saver books are transferred without our consent, we reserve the
right to restrain their use by, or take them from, other parties.
Top Value Stamp Book has these instructions:
mhe following rights and conditions . . . are expressly reserved by
this company . . . and are binding on the merchant's customers. [A]t all
times the title thereto (the stamps) being expressly reserved in this company
. . . subject to the rights of the merchants and their customers under the
contracts with this company. . . . [They are] evidence of cash payment.
The only right which you acquire in said stamps is to paste them in Top
Value Stamp books and present them to us for redemption. . . . [No]
further use . . . without our consent in writing. .'. . [I]f the stamps or
books are transferred without our consent, we reserve the right to restrain
their use by, or take them from other parties.
The S. & H. Stamp Book contains terms which are identical almost to the wording
that appears in the above examples.
RECENT DECISIONS
courts have made several comments in their opinions on this problem. In the second
Mechanics' Clothing Co. case it was said, "[Slince counsel for the complainant
(the trading stamp company) concede it, a collector of trading stamps may transfer
them to others for the same purpose for which they were originally issued, namely,
for redemption."1 4 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster clearly states, "The right
to redeem the stamps is a property right transferable by possession. . . . "'5 Finally,
in the first Mechanics Clothing Co. case the court said, "A collector of the stamps
is doubtless a holder for value, and there appears to be no reason why he cannot
transfer a stamp, with his rights of redemption, to any person and upon such terms
as he may see fit."' 6 Although these statements give strong support to the proposition
that the stamps are transferable if for redemption, it must be kept in mind that these
comments were only dicta. If the trading stamp company can show that there was
assent to the saving booklet's terms courts would undoubtedly acquiesce in the
limitation. This is precisely what appears to have happened in the unreported New
Jersey Superior Court case.17 The trading stamp company argued that even if the
customers were unaware of the limitations contained in the booklet, that their
acceptance of the stamps constitutes the same sort of unsigned contract as a
manufacturer's warranty or a train ticket. Judge Stanton must have accepted this
reasoning because he granted a temporary injunction against Vornado, Inc., from
exchanging its stamps for those of Sperry & Hutchinson.
There are several factors which operate to prevent the trading stamp company
from effectively asserting acceptance by the buying public. First, the face of the
stamp itself gives no indication of any limitation on transferability. The stamp, if
anything, appears to be a thing of value itself - the face of the most common
trading stamps carries the words, "CASH VALUE 1 MILL."' 8 Thus, the only argu-
ment that the trading stamp company can make must be based on the written
limitations printed in their saving books.
Second, if the question of nontransferability is to turn upon the effectiveness
of an outside writing, the trading stamp company will have a difficult time showing
assent. It is almost impossible to see when and how the buying public could have
agreed to the written terms in the saving books. Similar types of adhesion contracts
have met with great disfavor with the courts and writers.'9 An example of this at-
titude appears in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.:
Clauses on baggage checks20 restricting the liability of common carriers
for loss or damage in transit are not enforceable unless the limitation is
fairly and honestly negotiated and understandingly entered into. If not
called specially to the patron's attention, it is not binding. It is not enough
to show the form of a contract; it must appear also that the agreement was
understandingly made.
2'
Thus, even though the trading stamp company has made its limitation on
transferability of the stamps clear in its saving books, there appears to be no
opportunity for adequate assent on the part of the buying public. The retail
14 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833, 833-34 (C.C.D.R.I.
1904).
15 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster, 219 Fed. 755, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
16 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 128 Fed. 800, 803 (C.C.D.R.I.
1904).
17 See note 2 supra.
18 Top Value stamps, Plaid stamps, and S. & H. Green stamps.
19 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 90B (3rd ed. 1957).
20 This same theory on lack of assent has been applied to limitations on parcel checkroom
tickets, Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1946), aff'd, 296
N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947); O'Brien v. Pennsylvania R.R., 184 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). Also to storage warehouse receipts, French v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo.
424, 195 P.2d 968 (1948); Brasch v. SIoan's Moving & Storage Co., 237 Mo. App. 597, 176
S.W.2d 58 (1943). Automobile parking lot or garage tickets have been handled similarly,
Kravitz v. Parking Service Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 199 So. 727 (1940); Miller's Mutual Fire
Ins. Ass'n of Alton, Ill. v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
21 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 90-91 (1960).
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merchants do not inform the buying public of the terms contained in the saving
books. At the time of the transfer from the merchant to the customer there is nothing
in the sense of a bargained-for transaction, or an understanding as to the restric-
tions on the stamps. Coupled with the objective appearance of the stamp itself, this
places the company in an untenable position when it urges assent.
The third factor is the general knowledge that trading stamps are transferred
by the buying public. There is no way to establish the degree of such activity, but
there can be no denial that it does happen. Such passive acquiescence can arguably
amount to a waiver of the term.
Consideration of the three factors above can only lead the courts to hold the
nontransferability clause in the saving book to be unenforceable if the stamps are
transferred for redemption. There is no indication on the face of the stamp to give
any idea of this limitation; there is no actual understanding and consent to the
limitation at the time of issuance of the stamps to customers; and the trading stamp
company's inaction when it must have known of the transfers22 could easily amount
to a waiver. The dicta in the older cases23 is against the position of the trading
stamp company. The distinction made in these cases between the use of the stamp
for redemption and for advertisement will continue. As long as the transfer is for
redemption purposes only, the courts should not allow the trading stamp companies
to avoid their obligation by claiming that the stamps are subject to the written
limitations contained in their saving books.
Stephen C. Bower
EMINENT DOMAIN - URBAN REDEVELOPMENT - CONDEMNATION OF PRE-
DOMINANTLY VACANT AREA WITH No PHYSICAL BLIGHT. - Pursuant to the
provisions of General Municipal Law § 72-n, the City Planning Commission
approved a plan for the reclamation of a 100-acre area in the Carnarsie section
of Brooklyn. The designated area, 75% vacant, was comprised of lots small in size.
It had a poorly designed street pattern. The plaintiffs were owner-occupants of
22 An example of this would be the community-wide project to collect a mountain of
trading stamps to obtain something for the city's use. This group collection plan is also used
by many churches.
23 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster, 219 Fed. 755, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1915); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833, 833-34 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904); Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 128 Fed. 800, 803 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904).
1 N.Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 72-n provided:
Prevention of the development of slums and blighted areas and the
promotion of the orderly growth of municipalities through the clearance and
redevelopment of vacant or predominantly vacant areas. 1. Legislative find-
ing and declaration as to purpose of act. a. It is hereby found and declared
that there exist in many municipalities within this state vacant or predom-
inantly vacant areas characterized by the following conditions, factors or
characteristics or combinations thereof, with or without tangible physical
blight: (1) subdivision of land into'lots of such irregular form and shape
or such insufficient size, depth or width as renders them incapable of effective
or economic development; (2) obsolete and poorly designed street patterns
with inadequate access to such vacant or predominantly vacant areas or street
widths or block sizes which are unsuitable for appropriate development in
such areas; (3) unsuitable topographical, subsoil and other physical conditions
impeding the development of appropriate land uses; (4) an obsolete system
of utilities serving the area; (5) buildings and structures unfit for use and
occupancy as a result 'of age, obsolescence, dilapidation, inadequate main-
tenance, or other factors affecting their physical condition; (6) dangerous,
unsanitary or otherwise improper uses and conditions which adversely affect
the public health, safety and general welfare; and (7) scattered improve-
ments which, because of their incompatibility with an appropriate pattern
of land use and streets, retard the development of the land.
b. It is hereby further found and declared that, by reason of such con-
ditions, factors or characteristics or combinations thereof, with or without
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68 residential properties, in sound and sanitary condition, clustered together in
groups throughout the area. There was no tangible physical blight. Finding that
many commercial establishments had been obliged to leave their present sites
within the inner areas of New York City because of displacement by clearance
for public improvements, and finding, also, that the designated area was connected
by rail with transportation facilities appropriate for industrial use, the Commission
proposed the private redevelopment of the area as an industrial park. Plaintiffs
sought judgment declaring General Municipal Law § 72-n unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to that area. The Court of Appeals of New York, affirming
a dismissal of the complaint, held: that the statute was constitutional since the
condemnation of predominantly vacant, non-slum, private property for redevelop-
ment by private interest as an industrial park constituted a valid taking for a public
purpose. The Supreme Court of the United States denied an appeal for lack of
a substantial federal question. Cannata v. City of New York, 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204
N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1960), modified and aff'd, 14 App. Div. 2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.
2d 457 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal
denied, 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
The power of eminent domain is the right of the state to take private property
for public use. This power is qualified by the constitutional right that "No person
shall ... be deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
'2
The keystone of the power of eminent domain has been the concept of "public
use." This concept is not synonymous with "public purpose." Formerly, the taking
of private property merely because it served a purpose which, in some way, was
public in nature, was not sufficient to justify the exercise of this power. In People
ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, Justice Klingbiel dis-
cussed the distinction between public "use" and public "purpose." Speaking in the
dissent, he said that
... A mere public purpose for the taking [of land] is not equivalent to a
public use of the land. The power of eminent domain exists not to remedy
evils but to acquire property needed for public use. It is the proposed use or
development of the property which must be looked to in determining whether
it may be taken by condemnation. The fact that general prosperity and
public welfare will be promoted is not enough.
Traditionally there have been certain particular uses, public in character, for
which private property may be taken.4 The public use requirement has been served
when the condemned land is subsequently put to an actual use by the public, as
when property is condemned in order to provide a public highway.5 During the
post-war era of the 1940's, urban society was plagued by the menace of slum areas.
Simultaneously, the need for increased housing facilities became apparent. Urban
tangible physical blight, such areas impair or arrest the sound growth of the
community and tend to create slums and blighted areas....
g. It is hereby further found and declared that it is necessary to clear,
replan and develop or redevelop such vacant or predominantly vacant areas
for residential, commercial, industrial, community, public or other uses or
combinations of such uses in order to promote and protect the public health,
safety and general welfare; ...
This statute has been recodified in the "Urban Renewal Law," N.Y.
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 500-525 (Supp. 1962).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 14 Ill. 2d 74, 150 N.E. 2d 792, 797 (1958).
4 See JAuR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 10 (1953), where the author lists, as generally
recognized public uses, those relating: (1) specifically to the affairs of direct governmental
administration; (2) to public travel and communication; (3) to navigation; (4) to public
health; and (5) to education.
5 See generally, 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS pp. 1124-1141 (8th ed. 1927);
1 L~wis, LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 250-315 (3rd ed. 1909); 11
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 32.39-32.64 (3rd ed. 1950); MILLS, LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 10-29 (1879); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 7.1-7.627 (3rd ed.
1950).
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redevelopment statutes were passed to alleviate both problems.6 With the advent
of urban redevelopment, the "public use" concept in the early decisions7 dictated
that the removal of slum areas had to be accompanied by the erection of low-cost
housing. With the passage of time, however, the concept of "public use" was ex-
panded. The principle that only the taking of the property, as distinguished from
the subsequent use, need be in the public interest, was evolved.8 Thus, since the
requirement of public use is satisfied by the slum clearance itself, rehousing is no
longer required. The resale of the property to private interests does not destroy
the public use.9
These slum clearance cases are posited on the principle that the clearance
itself constitutes a public use because it results in the protection of the public from
conditions existing in slums which threaten their health and safety. In Berman v.
Parker,'0 however, this concept of "public use" was expanded. In that case the
owners of a department store sought to enjoin the condemnation of their property
under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.11 The project proposed
was the clearance of a slum area consisting primarily of deteriorated houses, for
private redevelopment. The Court was called upon to determine whether the
commercial property of the plaintiffs was so connected with the slum area so as
to make rehabilitation of that area impossible without the inclusion of the land
occupied by the store. Affirming, but only as modified, the judgment of the District
Court' 2 in permitting such condemnation, the Supreme Court spoke of public use
in terms of its being synonymous with public purpose. In so doing, it rejected the
limited interpretation of the District Court, which upheld the Act upon the narrow
interpretation, authorizing seizure of property only for the purpose of eliminating
conditions injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare. Speaking for
the Court in Berman, Mr. Justice Douglas stated13 that
. . . We think the standards prescribed were adequate for executing the
plan to eliminate not only slums as narrowly defined by the District Court
but also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums. Property may of
course be taken for this redevelopment which standing by itself, is innocuous
and unoffending.
In spite of its broad language, however, it must be remembered that Berman
involved the clearance of a slum area.' 4 Nonetheless, equating "public use" with
6 The first state to pass an urban redevelopment law was New York. N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 3301 (McKinney 1942). The statute was declared constitutional in Murray v. La-
Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
See 8 HASTINGS L. J. 241, 267-270 (1957) for a listing of all state redevelopment
statutes.
7 See, e.g., New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 153
(1936).
8 The clearance of the slum itself effectuates the requirement of public use. People ex Tel.
Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 68 N.E.2d 761 (1946); Chicago Housing Authority v.
Berkson, 415 Ill. 159, 112 N.E.2d 620 (1953); Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority,
139 A.2d 476 (Del. 1958).
9 Herzinger v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 203 Md. 49, 98 A.2d 87 (1953);
Murray v. LaGuardia, supra note 6. Incidental private benefit will not invalidate a project
which has a public purpose as its primary objective. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302
N.Y. 451, 99 N.E. 2d 235 (1951); Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 190 A. 425 (1937).
Public purpose is not destroyed if the land is ultimately used for private profits by the erection
of office buildings or other commercial structures. Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31,
70 A.2d 612 (1950) ; State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of
Kansas City, Mo., 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954). But see, Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C.
563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956); and, Adams v. Housing Authority of City of Daytona Beach, 60
So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952), where a subsequent sale to a private enterprise was held unconstitu-
tional.
10 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
11 60 Stat. 790, D.C. COD. §§ 5-701-5-719 (1951).
12 Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953).
13 Supra note 10 at 35.
14 In the area under consideration, it was found that "64.3% of the dwellings were beyond
repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had
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"public benefit" or "public advantage," courts, and particularly legislatures, have
thus sought to justify the condemnation of predominantly vacant areas, commonly
termed "blighted areas."
Slum areas are those found to be harmful to the health and safety of the
public because of the existence of such conditions as deteriorating buildings, in-
adequate housing, insanitary accommodations, a high rate of mortality, prevalence
of disease, and a high crime rate. A blighted area, on the other hand, is an area
found to be detrimental to sound economic growth because of the existence of
various factors set out in statutes.'5 Most often the term "blighted" is used in
reference to areas predominantly vacant. 6
State legislatures have been willing to extend the power of eminent domain
to the condemnation of "blighted areas" for redevelopment projects.1 7 Speaking
of blighted areas as those predominantly vacant areas detrimental to sound com-
munity growth because of variously enumerated conditions, 8 legislatures have
authorized their condemnation as serving the public welfare. Thus the Legislature
of New York amended the General Municipal Law by the addition of § 72-n in
1958. Setting forth several factors, 19 the Legislature stated that, "with or without
tangible physical blight," vacant or predominantly vacant land characterized by
these conditions would be subject to clearance, replanning and redevelopment.
Although other states have statutes embodying similar factors for the finding of a
blighted area,2 0 they do not go so far as to permit a taking of such an area in the
complete absence of physical blight. This carte blanche -delegation of power to
condemn land not physically blighted seems to be carrying the authority of Berman
farther than the Supreme Court had intended. The fact that the statute stated that
such a clearance is necessary for the prevention of slums21 is not persuasive. Yet
the Supreme Court denied the appeal in Cannata on the grounds that it presented
no substantial federal question.
22
Berman seems to have authorized the extension of the "public use" concept
to include the condemnation of blighted areas. 2 But even in granting judicial
recognition to the condemnation of blighted areas, Berman decided the validity of
such a taking in an area which, in addition to having factors of blight, was char-
acterized by marked physical deterioration. 24 In Cannata, on the other hand, there
existed no such tangible physical blight. In upholding the constitutionality of the
taking in that situation, it would seem that the Court of Appeals of New York has
outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or
laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central heating." Supra note 10 at 30.
15 See, e.g., supra note 1.
16 Even when referring to predominantly vacant areas, many statutes state that conditions
of physical blight must be found in the occupied section of the designated area. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33041-044; and N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-21.1 (Supp. 1961). Under
such statutes, the vacant areas might well be included under the general slum clearance provi-
sions by application of the area concept. [See Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 70, 115 N.E.2d
659 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954).] Some courts have asserted this view.
See, e.g., Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, supra note 8 at 484.
17 See generally, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-124 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4501
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67Y2, § 64 (Smith-Hurd 1959); PA. STAT. ANN. 'tit. 35, § 1702
(Supp. 1961). Some statutes provide for the reclamation of blighted areas in terms requiring
some type of physical deterioration in addition to a finding of the other statutorily defined factors.
They speak of these factors as a basis for condemnation when found in areas having sub-
standard or abandoned buildings. California, New Jersey, supra note 16.
18 See, e.g., supra note 1.
19 Supra note 1.
20 Supra note 16.
21 Supra note 1.
22 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
23 Public use has been spoken of as a concept that changes with the needs of the times.
Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, supra note 9.
24 See supra note 14.
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extended the Berman doctrine. The majority of the Court, however, speaking
through Chief Judge Desmond, summarily dismissed the contention that the absence
of tangible blight should have any bearing on the constitutionality of the condemna-
tion, by stating that "We agree with the courts below that an area does not have
to be a 'slum' to make its redevelopment a public use. .... ',25 However, Judge Van
Voorhis, dissenting in Cannata, fully recognized the extension being made by the
decision of the majority, and put the question of the constitutionality of such an
extension in the following words:26
Conceding that the power of eminent domain has been extended to the
elimination of areas that are actually slum the question here is whether this
power can be further extended to the condemnation of factories, stores, pri-
vate dwellings or vacant land which are properly maintained and are neither
substandard nor insanitary, so that their owners may be deprived of them
against their will to be resold to a selected group of private developers whose
projects are believed by the municipal administration to be more in harmony
with the times.
In Schneider v. District of Columbia2 7 the court issued a cogent warning which
still demands the attentive ear of courts and legislatures alike:
These extensions of the concept of eminent domain, to encompass public
purpose apart from public use, are potentially dangerous to basic principles
of our system of government. And it behooves the courts to be alert lest cur-
rently attractive projects impinge upon fundamental rights. . . . In these
principles lies one of the critical differences between our system of govern-
ment and the totalitarian systems.
Although the constitutionality of most statutes providing for the condemnation
of blighted areas has not yet been ruled upon, many cases have upheld the con-
stitutionality of the conditions28 set forth in these statutes for redeveloping pre-
dominantly vacant areas. Under most of these decisions, however, the courts have
been able to justify the clearance and redevelopment on the basis of slum clearance,
in itself a public use.29 Yet, citing many of these very same cases,30 the majority
in Cannata justifies the taking of a non-slum area having no physical blight. There
have been cases in which the courts have spoken, by way of dictum, of the taking
of land having no tangible blight; 31 but, before Cannata, no case went so far as
to permit the taking of land where there did not exist a combination of both the
factors prescribed by statute for blight and actual physical deterioration. The con-
stitutionality of these factors as the basis for the condemnation of vacant areas has
been upheld in some cases, at least where a combination of many of the factors
establishes a menace to the people of the community, so as to require redevelopment
25 Cannata v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d at 397.
26 Id. at 398.
27 117 F. Supp. 705, 716 (D.D.C. 1953).
28 Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Com. 321, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960);
Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 56 (1958); Gohld
Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954); People ex rel. Gutknecht
v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1953); Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa.
333, 98 A.2d 47 (1953).
29 In Graham v. Houlihan, 160 A.2d at 747, the fact was stated that as the result of "the
1955 flood, the first floors of 70 per cent of these buildings are under water, and the buildings
are vulnerable to future flooding." In Wilson v. Long Branch, 142 A.2d at 855, it was stated
that "58% of all the residential structures in the project area" had characteristics of slums.
In Gohld Realty Co. "v. City of Hartford, supra note 28, the vacant area was part of the gen-
eral slum area to be redeveloped. In People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, supra note
28, the statute involved permitted the taking of physically deteriorating properties. In Oliver
v. City of Clairton, supra note 28, over 50% of the dwellings in a predominantly vacant area
were substandard.
30 "The condemnation by the city of an area such as this so that it may be turned into
sites for needed industries is a public use (see Graham v. Houlihan, . . .; Wilson v. Long
Branch .... ; Berman v. Parker... )." 182 N.E.2d at 397.
31 Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, supra note 28.
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as a compelling community economic need.3 2 Still others maintain that prevention
of slum areas serves a public use.33
On the other hand, not all courts view the provisions relating to blighted
areas as clearly constitutional. Courts have often declined to express opinions as
to the constitutionality of blighted area provisions when called upon to decide
whether slum clearance statutes are valid.3 4 In Randolph v. Wilmington Housing
Authority;3 5 the court had to rule as to the constitutionality of a statute providing
for the condemnation of private property for slum clearance and private redevelop-
ment. In finding the statute constitutional as applied to that purpose, the court
refused to express an opinion on its constitutionality as applied to blighted areas,
but stated:
There are other sections of the act the application of which would cer-
tainly raise much more doubtful questions. For example, the act undertakes
to grant the power of eminent domain to eliminate a "blighted area," as that
term is defined in § 4501. A "blighted area" is one embodying "any com-
bination" of ten factors or conditions set forth in the section. Only two of
these appear to have any direct relation to public health, safety or morals,
i.e., unsanitary or unsafe conditions, and conditions endangering life or
property by fire or other causes.... The other factors, such as "defective
or inadequate street layout," "diversity of ownership," "tax or special assess-
ment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land," "unusual conditions
of title," "improper subdivision," etc., have no direct relation to public
health, safety or morals. They seem to reflect the idea that the State may
take A's property away from him for such diverse reasons as that it is not
used in the most efficient or economical manner, or is in a district improperly
or inartistically laid out, or in an area including some properties having
"diversity of ownership," and may sell it to B so that B may develop it in
a more efficient manner.
In other cases, courts have looked upon similar statutes as attempts to exercise
an unconstitutional control over privately owned property in order that the con-
demning agency might devote the land acquired to a use it considers more bene-
ficial. 6 In Hogue v. Port of Seattle,3 7 where an entire suburban area was declared
to be a blighted area for the purpose of redevelopment, the court refused to allow
the taking of such property. It held that a private landowner had the right to use
his land for any lawful purpose, and the state had no right to take it merely
because it may devise a plan for putting the property to some higher or better
economic use. Similarly, in Crommett v. City of Portland,"' the court stated that
"Taken alone, the redevelopment of a city is not, in our view, a 'public use' for
which either taxation or taking by eminent domain may properly be utilized."
The status of the law in dealing with the condemnation of blighted areas is
not yet clear. There are many courts which have found no obstacle in upholding
the taking of blighted areas, as defined by statute39 Other courts are still troubled
by the constitutional limitations imposed by the "public use" requirement.40 They
are especially hesitant about upholding the validity of taking when factors, other
32 Redevelopment Agency of the City and County of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal.
App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105, cert. denied, sub nom., Van Hoff v. Redevelopment Agency, 348
U.S. 897 (1954).
33 Courts have justified the taking of blighted areas as being directly related to slum
clearance. ". . . we are aware of no constitutional principle which paralyzes the power of
government to deal with evil until it has reached its maximum development." People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 121 N.E.2d at 795.
34 Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954).
35 139 A.2d 476, 484 (Del. 1958).
36 Opinion to the Governor, 69 A.2d 531, 536 (R.I. 1949). See Grubstein v. Urban
Renewal Agency of Tampa, Florida, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
37 341 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1959).
38 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841, 852 (1954).
39 See supra note 28.
40 See supra notes 34 and 36.
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than physical blight, are the sole basis of condemnation. 4 ' But in spite of this
uncertainty, Cannata seems to extend the Berman decision by going farther in the
process of land socialization by upholding the constitutionality of a statute permit-
ting the condemnation of property "with or without tangible physical blight."
In Berman, the Supreme Court stated that eminent domain was merely a
means to the exercise of the police power. Many states have approved the rede-
velopment of blighted vacant areas on this authority. But such an assimilation of
the objective of police power 42 with the public use requirement of eminent domain,
sacrifices a traditional safeguard against the unconscionable taking of private
property. Keeping the distinctions between the two powers in mind, courts, when
determining the limits to be imposed upon redevelopment agencies, should distinguish
between the regulation or destruction of property for the promotion of the general
welfare, as opposed to the condemnation of property for public use.43 Dissenting
in People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission,44 Justice
Klingbiel stated that
Whenever a police regulation bears a substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the public it must be sustained .... It will
be observed, therefore, that the police power is subject in its exercise to
constitutional limitations of a different nature than those which attach to the
power of eminent domain.... Where it is sought to take private property,
rather than merely to regulate its use, a different test applies. It is not
enough to show a general relationship to public health, safety, morals, or
welfare. The inquiry relates, instead, to the proposed use of the property.
Many decisions seem to allow the government agencies the same broad powers in
eminent domain, under a standard of reasonableness, that exist under the police
power under that same standard. 45 How far this approach could lead can be
seen in Puerto Rico, where any private property may be taken for general economic
reconstruction of the island.46
Briefly, to summarize this development, we find that mere taking was first
accepted as fulfillment of the "public use" requirement for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain in cases of slum clearance.47 Extended to apply to the
taking of blighted areas, this principle has been upheld by some courts, but primarily
because of the prevalence of actual slum conditions in addition to findings of other
factors of blight.4 8 But by its decision in the Cannata case, the New York Court
of Appeals seems to say in effect that any taking of property is a public use if any
public benefit results. The words of warning found in the Schneider case4 9 should
be recalled in this connection.
Under our democratic form of government, the power of eminent domain
is permitted only when exercised for a public use. Its exercise, therefore, should
41 Although not found in any decisions, perhaps one of the reasons for this hesitancy is
that such factors as irregularity in street patterns, diversity of ownership, and irregularity of
lot shapes seem hardly a tenable ground for the condemnation of land, especially today, when
one considers the waning popularity of row-housing with suburban planners and also the in-
creased demand for single family residences in outlying areas. With grilled street patterns on
the decline, all lots and streets planned by city architects are of irregular pattern and design.
42 See generally, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
43 The limitation of reasonableness placed upon the exercise of the police power, as distin-
guished from the dual limitations of public use and payment of just compensation, placed upon
the exercise of the eminent domain power, are discussed in SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDATION,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1959 INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, pp. 1-37.
44 150 N.E.2d at 798.
45 See Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54
A.2d 277 (1947); Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950); People
ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 14 IIl. 2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792
(1958).
46 People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946).
47 Cases cited notes 8 and 9 supra.
48 Supra notes 28 and 29.
49 Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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at all times be consonant with the constitutional protection afforded private owner-
ship of property. Carrying the present trend typified by Cannata to its logical
conclusion, it would be possible for the government authority to take all private
property just so long as it could be shown that the public could benefit.
Writing in the 19th century, Judge Cooley said that ". . . a due protection
of the rights of private property will preclude the government from seizing it in
the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of public
benefit to spring from a more profitable use to which the latter will devote it.' 50
Nonetheless, since the Berman case, the Supreme Court has dismissed appeals in
cases51 involving the condemnation of blighted areas, as it denied an appeal in
Cannata, for want of a substantial federal question. Furthermore, that Court has
denied certiorari and left undisturbed the judgments in several other cases.52 If
the inherent right of private ownership of property is to be protected, if public
use now means public benefit or public advantage, then perhaps the time has come
for the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the present status of the power of eminent
domain, and its expansion since Berman, especially in the light of the Cannata
extension of the power to the redevelopment of privately owned property having
no physical blight. Failing to do this, there is essentially no effective restriction
on the power of government to take the private property of its citizens and transfer
it to others to further plans and programs which it considers to be servient to the
public interest.
Frank J. Miele
APPEAL AND ERROR - GRAND JURY - PETITIONERS HAVE No RIGHT TO AP-
PEAL FROM A DENIAL OF THEmR REQUEST FOR A SPECIAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGA-
TIoN. - A group of five residents and taxpayers in Philadelphia brought a petition
to convene a special grand jury to investigate alleged corruption in the city govern-
ment. From an order of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County dis-
missing the petition, the residents and taxpayers appealed. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, acting on a motion to quash, held: appeal dismissed. Appellants, hav-
ing no more than a public interest in the proceeding to convene the grand jury,
are not "parties aggrieved." Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 180 A.2d 782 (1962).
In all states, citizens are given the constitutional right to petition the state
government or bodies thereof for the redress of grievances.1 The first problem, there-
fore, is to examine whether a petition by a citizen to convene a special grand jury
to investigate alleged corruption in city government is an acceptable method of
exercising this constitutional right.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Philadelphia County Grand Jury
Investigation Case2 recognized the right of a group of seventy citizens and tax-
payers to present a memorial asking that a special grand jury investigation be made
50 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 1129.
51 Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency, 157 Cal. App, 2d 243, 320 P.2d 884, appeal dis-
missed, 358 U.S. 56 (1958).
52 Wilson v. Long Branch, supra note 28; Redevelopment Agency of the City and County
of San Francisco v. Hayes, supra note 32; Graham v. Houlihan, supra note 28.
1 E.g.,
"The people have the right ... to make known their opinions to their
representatives, and to petition for the redress of grievances." N.J. CONST.
art. 1, § 18.
"The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner . . . to apply to those
invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or
other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance." PA. CONST.
art. 1, § 20"
2 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943).
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of the city Registration Committee.3 The memorial was granted, but on appeal
by the Registration Committee, a writ of prohibition was issued. In refusing to
allow the investigation, the court did not question the right of the Committee to
present the memorial to the Court of Quarter Sessions, rather, the writ was issued
because the memorial did not allege sufficient facts.
In the Petition of Hamilton,4 a group of citizens and taxpayers presented a
petition to the Presiding Judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia
County. The petition alleged that a high degree of corruption existed in the gov-
ernment of the city of Philadelphia and asked that a special grand jury be con-
vened. After hearing the evidence offered the presiding Judge, without question-
ing the right of the citizens to present the petition, determined that a grand jury
investigation was not warranted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the right of the citizens to initiate the proceedings below was, again, not questioned."
Other states have likewise determined that citizens may exercise their right to
petition for redress of grievances by seeking the aid of the grand jury. The Supreme
Court of Alabama stated that public policy demands that a citizen be able to re-
quest an investigation by a grand jury of alleged crime or corruption in his city or
state.6 In Brack v. Wells,7 the Supreme Court of Maryland outlined the procedure
a citizen must follow in seeking the aid of a grand jury. The court said that a
citizen desiring to bring a grand jury's attention to alleged violations of criminal
laws should exhaust his remedy before the magistrate and state's attorney, and,
if relief cannot be had there, the citizen may then ask the foreman of the grand
jury to hear his petition.
The only way that the states qualify the citizen's right to seek the aid of the
grand jury is in relation to the manner in which his petition must be presented.
In Alabama, he may petition the grand jury directly.' In Maryland he must first
present his petition to the magistrate or state attorney general and only if these
sources fail to act on it, may he then petition the grand jury directly.9 Finally, in
Pennsylvania, he must present his petition to the magistrate, attorney general, or
District Attorney and rely on one of these men to take his petition to the grand
jury, for he himself has no right to directly approach it.'0
In recognizing the constitutional right of a citizen to petition for the re-
dress of grievances by seeking the aid of the grand jury, a problem exists as to
whether the states further protect this right by insuring that the petitioning citi-
zen's complaint will not be dismissed without first being heard by the grand jury -
or at least affording the right of review by an appellate court.
Alabama guarantees the citizen that his petition will be heard and an investi-
gation will be granted or denied by the grand jury itself.' 1 Maryland assures the
citizen that if his petition is not acted upon by the magistrate or attorney general,
he may present it directly to the grand jury for its determination. 12 At least one
state has gone even farther than Alabama and Maryland. The Oklahoma Con-
stitution, art. 2, § 18 states: ". . . [O]r such grand jury shall be ordered by such
judge upon the filing of a petition signed by one hundred resident taxpayers of
the community; . . ." In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court of Okla-
3 There appears to be no significant difference in the terms petition and memorial. In
the Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, 346 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943) the
Committee filed a memorial, whereas in the Petition of Hamilton,- Pa. D. & C.2d - (Ct. Q.
Sess. 1961), the citizens and taxpayers filed a petition seeking similar court action.
4 -Pa. D. & C.2d- (Ct. Q. Sess. 1961).
5 Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 180 A.2d 782 (1962).
6 King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 234 Ala. 106, 173 So. 498 (1937).
7 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
8 King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., supra note 6.
9 Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
10 Note, Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation in Pennsylvania, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 73 (1961).
11 King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., supra note 6.
12 Brack v. Wells, supra note 9.
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homa said that the ordering of a grand jury and the presentation of such peti-
tion to it is mandatory and not within the discretion of the judge to whom the
petition, signed by one hundred resident taxpayers, is presented.13
In all of the states that have decided the question, except Pennsylvania, the
right of the citizen to petition the grand jury to investigate alleged crime or cor-
ruption is protected to the extent that his petition will not be denied on the de-
termination of one man alone, but rather, will be accepted or rejected by the
grand jury itself.14 Pennsylvania, by its Supreme Court's decision in Appeal of
Hamilton, appears to be the only state in which a citizen's right to seek the aid
of the grand jury for redress of alleged crime or corruption is lost upon a denial
of his petition by the presiding judge to whom it is presented. "In the absence of
statutory authority, no one has the right to appeal in proceedings of such a char-
acter, unless he is authorized to act in matters relating to the 'public welfare,' or
has some personal right, necessary to be specially protected. This personal right,
or beneficial interest, must be distinct from that of the general public and dif-
ferent therefrom in kind and substance."'15
The problem raised by the decision and the court's reasoning in Appeal of
Hamilton, then, is whether, in light of the recognition by all states that citizens may
exercise their constitutional right to petition for the redress of grievances by seek-
ing a grand jury investigation of alleged crime or corruption and in light of the
protection given this right by all states examined except Pennsylvania, the "Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was correct in its determination that citizens could not ap-
peal from a denial of their petition by a presiding judge.
Research has failed to disclose any decision prior to Appeal of Hamilton deal-
ing with the right of a citizen and taxpayer to appeal from a denial of a grand
jury investigation under the facts of Hamilton. This is so, perhaps, because in
those states other than Pennsylvania where such petitions have been made, the
citizen is assured that his petition will ultimately be decided upon by the grand
jury itself.' 6 Apparently the court in Hamilton is the first to deny citizens and tax-
payers the right to appeal on ground that they had no more than a public interest
in the proceeding.
The law is clear that a party, to appeal, must have an "interest" in the pro-
ceeding.'7 Generally, the right must rest on some legally recognized interest in
the matter.' The issue then appears to be whether some public interests should
also be legally recognized interests such as will enable the party with such interests
to appeal.
As was previously said, citizens have a constitutional right to petition a branch
of their state government for redress of grievances, and a petition asking the court
to convene a grand jury to investigate alleged crime or corruption is a legally
recognized method of exercising this right. It would seem that, the court in Hamil-
ton should have at least considered that the interest in the result of the proceed-
ing might be legally recognized in that the right to bring the petition was granted
by the state constitution.
It is true that in some situations citizens have been given the right by statute
to petition for the removal of certain public officials, and have been denied the
right to appeal from an adverse determination of that petition. A good example
is the case of Kenny v. Hickey19 wherein a citizen brought an action, pursuant to
a right given him by statute, to remove the trustee of a county hospital. In deny-
13 Ogden v. Hunt, 286 P.2d 1088 (Okla. 1955).
14 King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., supra note 6; Brack v. Wells, supra note 9;
Ogden v. Hunt, supra note 13.
15 Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 180 A.2d 782, 783 (1962).
16 Ibid.
17 See generally, 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 22.01 et seq. (1958).
18 See, e.g., In re Estate of Verbeck; 114 Ohio App. 155, 180 N.E.2d 615 (1961).
19 60 Nev. 187, 105 P.2d 192 (1940).
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ing his appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada said: "His status is nothing more
than a dissatisfied party. It does not appear that he might be remotely interested
as a taxpayer, if such were entitled to appeal herein, which we do not decide."20
Taxpayers have also been denied the right of appeal where they were not parties
to the action below. In Amherst v. Wragg,21 a citizen and taxpayer asked the city
solicitor to institute an injunction proceeding against the board of trustees, its clerk,
the mayor and the village clerk from entering into a contract for the construction
of an electric generating plant. The proceeding was instituted by the solicitor but
the defendant's demurrer was sustained! The taxpayer asked the solicitor to ap-
peal but he refused. The taxpayer, then, without having made application to in-
tervene in the lower court, filed an appeal. This appeal was dismissed on the
grounds that the taxpayer was not a party to the original litigation.
In both of these cases the rights and interests of the parties are distinguishable
from those of the parties in Appeal of Hamilton. In the Hickey case the rights of
the appellant were similar to those of the appellants in Hamilton in that in both
cases the parties had the right to initiate the proceedings in the lower court. The
interests of the parties in these cases, however, were not the same. In Hickey, the
denial of the appellant's request did not have any effect on him as a taxpayer. In
the words of the court, "it does not appear that he might be remotely interested
as a taxpayer .... ,,22 In Hamilton, however, the denial of the appellants' petition
for the investigation of the allegedly corrupt city government had the effect of
denying the appellants their rights as taxpayers to guard against the mismanage-
ment of the city affairs and the misappropriation of the city tax funds. In the
Wragg case, the appellant was not a party to the action below whereas in Hamilton
the appellants instituted the proceedings.
Dealing with the question of whether an interest may be both publicly and
legally recognized so as to give a party standing to appeal, a court recognized that
certain types of public interest are more important and demand greater protection
than others.2 3 In the Kensington Club Case,2 4 a case cited in Hamilton, the facts
were as follows: The owner of the Kensington Club applied to the Liquor Control
Board for a liquor license and his application was denied. An appeal was made to
the Court of Quarter Sessions and, with only one of the three judges sitting, the
decision of the Liquor Control Board was reversed. On appeal, the court reversed
and remanded stating that it must be heard and decided by the appellate court
en banc. In reaching this decision the court said that the grant of a liquor license
". .. is a subject of paramount importance to the public . . .",25 and public wel-
fare demands that the whole tribunal be called upon to adjudicate the question.
The significance of the Kensington case in relation to the point in question
is the stressing by the court of the importance of the public interest involved in
the particular proceeding. It would seem that if the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was unwilling to allow a question of such great public importance to be decided
by only one of the three appellate court judges, the question of grand jury investi-
gation into alleged corruption in city government should not be a matter for final
decision by one judge. Certainly the harm to the public that results from a corrupt
city government is as great, if not greater than the public harm resulting from an
indiscriminate allocation of liquor licenses. Chief Justice Bell in his dissenting opinion
in Appeal of Hamilton, emphasized the point made here when he stated:
If the petitioners have, as they have, a standing in the lower Court
to petition for a grand jury proceeding, they should have a right and a
20 Kenny v. Hickey, 60 Nev. 187, 105 P.2d 192, 193 (1940).
21 72 Ohio App. 303, 51 N.E.2d 420 (1941), aff'd, 139 Ohio St. 371, 40 N.E.2d 149
(1942).
22 Kenny v. Hickey, supra note 20.
23 Kensington Club Case, 164 Pa. Super. 401, 65 A.2d 428 (1949).
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 431.
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status in a matter such as this, to appeal to this Court from the refusal of
the lower Court to convene a special grand jury ... (I)t is imperative
that such right exist in order to adequately, protect their community. Were
it otherwise, a District Attorney -if lie were of a complacent nature, or
lazy, or incompetent, or mistaken about the law, or his powers or duties,
or motivated primarily by political considerations, - could with impunity
refuse to petition for, and a Judge with similar traits could refuse to con-
vene a special grand jury, no matter how great and widespread were the
alleged crimes and corruption nor how great the necessity for such investi-
gation. If such were the law, law abiding citizens of the community would
in such instances have absolutely no redress or protection.
28
It would seem that the court in Hamilton failed to consider that: 1) A public
interest in a proceeding may also be, because of its nature and importance to the
public welfare, a legally recognized interest such as will give the parties standing
to appeal. 2) A liberal interpretation of Article 1, Section 20 of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania, would have allowed appellants, who had been denied redress by
the presiding judge, to present their petition directly to the grand jury.
Neither of the solutions proposed would have been in conflict with accepted
principles of law. It has been seen that certain public rights demand greater pro-
tection than others,27 and that some states, faced with the question of protecting
a citizen's right to petition for the convening of a grand jury to investigate alleged
crime or corruption, have done so to the extent that the citizen is assured that the
grand jury itself will make the final determination as to whether or not an in-
vestigation is warranted.
In conclusion it is suggested that either a liberal judicial interpretation of
Article 1, Section 20 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania or legislative adoption of
a statute similar to that in force in Oklahoma s would eliminate the most strik-
ing fault of the decision reached in the Appeal of Hamilton, namely, the inability
of the citizens and taxpayers to protect themselves from corrupt city officials in the
event that the District Attorney or the presiding judge or both. possessed the traits
enumerated by Chief Justice Bell in his dissent.
Robert M. Hanlon
26 Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 180 A.2d 782, 802-803 (1962).
27 Kensington Club Case, 164 Pa. Super. 401, 65 A.2d 428 (1949).
28 Okla. Const. art. 2, § 18.
